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SALT II
Can It End The Arms Race?



An accord that's supposed to put a ceiling on the weapons buildup may produce some surprising results—if it's approved by the Senate.

The strategic-arms-limitation treaty that the United States has just concluded with Russia promises to trigger the fiercest ratification struggle since the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles 60 years ago.

Battle lines already are sharply drawn, even before the formal signing of the pact by President Carter and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev at a summit June 15-18 in Vienna.

The ratification fight will revolve around this question: Will the new SALT treaty help or hamper the U.S. in countering a dangerous Soviet challenge—one that could shift the strategic balance in Moscow's favor by 1985?

Dangers of rejection. The administration contends that the arms accord will blunt the Russian challenge while leaving the U.S. free to proceed with essential weapons programs. Carter warned on May 10 that if the pact were rejected "we would be looked upon as a warmonger."

Critics, on the other hand, insist that the U.S. will be seriously handicapped by the agreement—in fact, will be frozen into a position of strategic inferiority. The Senate, they insist, must remedy the treaty's deficiencies with amendments that could require further negotiations with the Soviets.

Whatever their differences, the rival forces agree on one thing: With or without the new SALT treaty, the superpower arms race will continue and probably will be intensified in the decade ahead.

The step-up actually has begun. The Pentagon is proposing a 2-billion-dollar increase in spending in the 1980 fiscal year beginning October 1 to modernize the American "triad" of strategic forces—land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles and bombers.

Even bigger boosts are expected over the next few years to finance a new fleet of aircraft to carry cruise missiles and to replace the increasingly vulnerable Minuteman force with a new system of mobile missiles.

Special Report

To quote a ranking White House official: "SALT II does not signal an end to the arms race. It does not mean an end to competition between the Soviets and the U.S. It is not a substitute for a strong defense. But it is decidedly better than having no treaty at all."

What, in fact, does the second Soviet-American SALT agreement do to regulate the weapons race? And why is it generating so much controversy?

Actually the agreement, guidelines of which were laid down by former President Ford and Brezhnev at Vladivostok on Nov. 24, 1974, consists of three documents—the treaty, a protocol and a declaration of principles to guide the next round of SALT talks.

The treaty, running to Dec. 31, 1985, limits the strategic nuclear forces of the two superpowers to a total of 2,250 delivery vehicles—intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles and long-range bombers.

The Soviets, with forces already substantially above the ceiling, will be obliged to dismantle approximately 270 of their older missiles by 1982. (See chart on page 23). U.S. strength currently is well below the ceiling.

By establishing the principle of overall numerical equality in strategic missiles and bombers, the accord marks a distinct departure from the SALT I agreement signed in 1972, which recognized Soviet superiority in missiles.

Of even greater importance are the sublimits on multiple warheads, since these greatly increase the number of targets that can be hit. There is a ceiling of 1,320 on the total number of missiles that may be armed with MIRV's—multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles—and bombers that can be equipped with clusters of cruise missiles.

Of these, the number of missiles, land-based and submarine-launched, that may be MIRVed is limited to a maximum of 1,200. No more than 820 of these missiles may be land-based.

A check on technology. The agreement also limits the number of multiple warheads on each missile and the maximum number of cruise missiles on each bomber. The aim is to establish rough but not necessarily equal limits on the total number of nuclear warheads that the two superpowers can

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Four Key Figures in Forthcoming Senate Battle

Jackson. "The treaty will permit Soviets to deploy substantially superior strategic force."

Nunn. "We must not allow the Soviet Union to hold our land-based ICBM's at risk."

Baker. "Senate ought to consider this treaty in context of total U.S.-Soviet relationship."

Glenn. "Verification issue will be the critical issue when this comes before the Senate."

launch. While existing missiles may be modernized to improve accuracy and explosive power, only one new "light" land-based missile may be introduced by Russia and the U.S. between now and Dec. 31, 1985. This is viewed as a modest step to slow down the rate of change generated by future advances in technology.

In addition to these limits set by the treaty, the temporary protocol bars the deployment or flight-testing of mobile missiles and air-to-surface ballistic missiles. Also barred is the deployment of ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of more than 375 miles. This ban runs to Dec. 31, 1981. Administration officials say that none of these weapons could be produced by the U.S. within the time span covered by the protocol.

Benefits for U.S. The Carter administration maintains that this package deal is distinctly advantageous for the U.S. Without SALT II, Defense Secretary Harold Brown says that the Russians could deploy an additional 500 strategic weapons by 1985. Administration officials point out that the Russians would be free to test and deploy four new powerful missiles that they have developed.

Brown argues that the U.S. would be compelled to spend an additional 30 billion dollars on its strategic forces over the next 10 years in response to a still-greater Soviet challenge.

Critics dispute the administration's claim that SALT establishes a principle of equality in superpower strategic forces. The influential British weekly *The Economist* puts their argument this way: "On the surface, the proposed new treaty is neatly balanced, but it conceals, just under the surface, a large imbalance in Russia's favor."

Three factors behind this "large imbalance" are cited. First, Russia will be able to reach the ceiling of 820 land-based missiles with multiple warheads while the U.S. will not be able to get beyond 550 before 1985. Second, the Soviets are allowed to retain 308 super-missiles, capable of carrying 10 warheads each, while the U.S. will have none. Third, all of Russia's land-based missiles can carry more than the three warheads fitted to America's Minuteman missile.

As a result of these advantages, the Soviets within a few years will be in a position to threaten a knockout attack against this country's force of 1,054 land-based missiles.

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sums up the danger: "By some time in the early 1980s, the Soviet Union will have the capability to destroy with a reasonable degree of confidence most of our land-based ICBM's. In the same period of time, we will not be able to destroy the Soviet ICBM force. This creates a gap in the design of the two forces that is bound to have geopolitical consequences, especially since we are clearly inferior in forces capable of local intervention."

Secretary Brown acknowledges the threat, but he maintains that the U.S. would face it with or without SALT.

It is against this background that the Senate battle over ratification of the SALT II treaty is shaping up. The debate is expected to focus on five specific issues:

1. Policing the Soviets. The treaty provides that the U.S. and Russia will monitor compliance by relying on so-called national technical means, such as spy satellites and electronic-monitoring stations. With the loss of key U.S. monitoring stations in Iran, critics claim that it is impossible to verify Soviet performance.

The argument as summed up by Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.): "The loss of the facilities in Iran has done irreparable harm for years to come to our capacity to monitor Soviet strategic weapons development." Administration officials disagree. They say that the Russians might get away with minor cheating, but if they attempted it on a scale that would pose dangers for the U.S., they would be detected.

Some observers say the administration's success or failure in the ratification fight will hinge on its ability to convince the Senate on this score.

2. Countering Soviet challenge. Critics argue that the U.S. could be seriously hampered by SALT in its efforts to meet the Soviet threat to its Minuteman force. They fear that the protocol ban against mobile missiles will be extended indefinitely. Also, questions have been raised about the fate of an American plan to build a multiple protective shelter system—MPS—to conceal U.S. land-based missiles. Under this plan, clusters of silos would be dug and a missile launcher would be shuttled around the holes in each cluster in a kind of "shell game."

During the negotiations, the Carter administration informed the Soviets that it considered this proposal consistent with the treaty. But the Russians rejected the argument, contending that the plan would violate the verification provisions of the treaty. Critics say it would be dangerous for the Senate to ratify SALT until this question is clarified to U.S. satisfaction. Says Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.): "We must not allow the Soviet Union to hold our land-based ICBM's at risk."

Some senators want an ironclad Carter commitment to build a mobile land-based missile system at a cost of 20 to 30 billion dollars.

3. Exempting Backfire. The administration's decision to omit any limits on the controversial Backfire bomber from the treaty is bound to face a strong challenge, possibly supported by some military officials. President Car-

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SALT II at a Glance

Limits on Strategic Nuclear Weapons Through 1985
If the new treaty is ratified, the U.S. and Russia each could have—

Total strategic vehicles



(long-range missiles and bombers) **2,250**
(2,400 through 1981)

Of those—

Land-based and submarine-based missiles with MIRV's



(multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles), maximum **1,200**

Of those—

Land-based missiles with MIRV's, maximum

..... **820**
(quota for Russia can include up to 308 large SS-18 missiles; for U.S., none)

Plus—

Bombers armed with cruise missiles **120**
(can be increased if number of missiles with MIRV's is reduced correspondingly)



Further, between now and 1982—



Mobile land-based missiles: Flight testing and deployment banned.



Cruise missiles: Those launched from the ground or sea limited to 375 miles in range.

Russia's Backfire bomber: No limits, but the Soviet Union promises informally not to increase production above current rate of about 30 a year or to deploy bomber in intercontinental strategic role. U.S. reserves right to produce comparable plane.

Where the Strategic-Arms Race Stands

Long-Range Missiles and Bombers

	Today		1985 With SALT		1985 Without SALT	
	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
Total of missiles and bombers	2,059	2,516	2,002	2,250	2,002	2,928
Individually targeted warheads	9,200	4,900	11,700	9,500	15,000	11,700
Payload of missiles and bombers (million pounds)	7.2	12.0	8.3	13.6	11.2	17.6

SALT advocates say— Numbers show that Russia would be much further ahead by 1985 without a SALT agreement.

But SALT critics say— Figures tell only part of the story; other provisions of the pact will handcuff America in competing with the Soviets.

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dept. of Defense; American Enterprise Institute

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20 Years of Arms Agreements—What the Record Shows

Besides the SALT II treaty that has just been concluded, the U.S. and the Soviet Union have signed 14 other bilateral or multilateral arms-control agreements over the past 20 years. They are—

Antarctic treaty—1959. Bans all military activities in Antarctic.

Hot-line agreement—1963. Establishes a direct communication link between Washington and Moscow for use in emergency situations. The supplemental 1971 accord provides for a satellite communications system.

Limited-test-ban treaty—1963. Prohibits the tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater. Two nuclear powers, France and China, were not among the 103 signatories.

Outer-space treaty—1967. Prohibits orbiting of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction and installation of military bases or fortification or testing of weapons on celestial bodies.

Nuclear-nonproliferation treaty—1968. Designed to prevent spread of nuclear weapons, the pact commits nonnuclear states to refrain from developing nuclear weapons and commits nuclear power to reduce their armaments.

Seabed treaty—1971. Bans nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed beyond the 12-mile limit.

Nuclear-accidents pact—1971. Provides safeguards by Russia and U.S. against accidental detonation or unintended launching of nuclear weapons.

Biological-warfare convention—1972. Prohibits development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons, and calls for destruction of existing stocks of these weapons.

Agreement on prevention of high-seas incidents—1972. Provides measures to assure safety of navigation of ships and planes of U.S. and Soviet Union on or over the high seas.

ABM treaty—1972. As subsequently modified, the pact limits deployment of antiballistic missiles to one site in the U.S. and Russia.

Interim SALT agreement—1972. Provides ceiling for five years on total number of Soviet and American intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The agreement expired in 1977 but has been tacitly extended.

Threshold test-ban treaty—1974. Prohibits Russia and U.S. from conducting any underground nuclear-weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. The Senate has not ratified it, but Russia and U.S. are observing terms of the accord.

Peaceful-nuclear-explosions treaty—1976. Limited size of peaceful nuclear explosions to under 150 kilotons, and provides for limited on-site inspection. The Senate has not ratified it.

Convention banning modification of environment—1977. Prohibits military or any other hostile use of techniques to modify the environment. The U.S. and Soviet Union joined 32 other nations in signing, but Senate has not ratified it.



Hot line links Washington with Moscow as result of agreement signed in 1963.

ter accepted the Soviet argument that this is not a strategic bomber, despite evidence that it can hit American targets on one-way missions.

The Soviets, in a separate statement, promise to limit Backfire production to 30 a year and "to limit upgrading of the capabilities of this aircraft." The U.S. insists that the statement is as binding as the treaty.

4. Straining the alliance. Many Europeans are disturbed by U.S. willingness to accept limits—ostensibly temporary—on ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles that might be useful for their defense. At the same time, they point out, the administration is not insisting on comparable curbs on Soviet weapons targeted on Europe—the Backfire bomber and the SS-20 missile.

The Europeans fear that Russia will challenge as illegal any proposal for the U.S. to share cruise-missile technology with its allies. A number of senators have signaled their intention to demand clear-cut assurances on this issue, even if it requires an amendment and further negotiations with the Soviets.

5. Deterring Soviet adventurism. Republicans have declared their intention to link ratification of the SALT treaty to evidence of Soviet good behavior internationally—for example, in Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Angola and the Middle East. Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker of Tennessee, a presidential aspirant, is taking the lead in pressing for such linkage, which the administration opposes.

In the face of these challenges, what are the prospects for ratification of the SALT treaty? Even the most enthusiastic supporters concede that at the moment the odds favor treaty opponents, who need only 34 votes in the Senate to block acceptance, as opposed to 67 votes required for ratification.

But administration officials are confident that they can repeat the feat they achieved when they won approval of the Panama Canal treaties last year against seemingly insurmountable odds. They point out that public-opinion polls indicate strong support for an arms treaty, in contrast to overwhelming opposition to the Panama accords.

In this battle, one argument that the administration is certain to forgo is the claim that the SALT treaty will end the arms race. In fact, the final price for ratification may be a firm commitment to Senate fence sitters by the White House to speed up American weapons programs in order to counter the Soviet challenge. □

This article was written by Assistant Editor Joseph Fromm.

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How Satellites May Help to Sell SALT

The administration is relying on "spies in the sky" to police the arms pact. Is that enough to convince senators that Russia can't cheat?

In the Senate battle that will determine the fate of the new strategic-arms-limitation treaty with Russia, there is one clear make-or-break issue:

Can the administration convince 67 senators that the Russians cannot engage in serious cheating without being detected by the U.S.?

That question is deemed more critical than ever in light of the loss of America's electronic monitoring stations in Iran and the vulnerability of similar stations in Turkey.

The administration, in seeking Senate ratification of the arms treaty, will have to demonstrate that the job of verifying Soviet compliance can be done—largely by America's highly technical system of spy satellites.

To supply ammunition to committed supporters of SALT in this coming battle, the White House for the first time is lifting the lid on one of this nation's most secret intelligence operations.

President Carter himself set the stage for unveiling some of the facts about the multibillion-dollar spy-satellite project with a carefully worded statement: "Photo-reconnaissance satellites have become an important stabilizing factor in world affairs. In the monitoring of arms-control agreements, they make an immense contribution to the security of all nations. We shall continue to develop them."

A close look. The President did not elaborate. But from private talks with top-level CIA and Pentagon officials, *U.S.News & World Report* has put together this picture of what the latest highly complex satellites can and cannot do, how they are used and just how effective they are.

Today the U.S. has a number of operational surveillance satellites circling the globe, reporting on every square mile of the Soviet Union. A variety of types is involved, using a variety of techniques. They look for gaps in the cloud cover, take pictures, record radio and radar transmissions and watch for unexpected Soviet missile launches.

The standard photo satellite now in orbit is known as Big Bird, a huge structure compared with the "orbiting cameras" of just a few years ago. Each Big Bird is about 50 feet long and 10 feet in diameter, crammed full of highly sophisticated photographic and communications equipment. It weighs roughly 11 tons, in contrast to the 38 pounds of early U.S. satellites.

Most spy satellites are launched into orbit from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, at the rate of two or three a year. The biggest are carried aloft by a powerful, 59-million-dollar Titan 3D rocket, directed southwest out over the Pacific and fitted into a near-polar orbit. The big satellite circles the globe over the poles every hour and a half as the earth turns under it, thus covering a different area each time around. Circling the earth at an altitude of 100 miles or more, it stays up for several months of intensive surveillance—200 days by one report.

Exactly what the Big Bird can do is given in broad terms. It routinely takes thousands of black-and-white photos of the entire Russian land mass. Its complex cameras can zoom in on anything suspicious and take close-up color photos or infrared pictures if needed.

These photos are sent back to intelligence technicians in the U.S. in one of two different ways. Most are processed automatically on board and "zapped" back electronically, much like a television broadcasting station, to U.S. receiving stations spotted strategically around the world. But when maximum resolution is called for, actual photos are dropped from Big Bird in a special re-entry packet. The packet is caught in midair, as it floats by parachute through the latter part of its descent, by specially equipped aircraft based in Hawaii.

Officials who have seen photos sent back from the big satellite say the quality of the pictures is "astounding." Long-focal-length lenses and high-quality film are used so that even small details become clear when the photographs are enlarged.

What this means in practical terms is that a trained technician can detect objects only slightly larger than a tennis ball in a photo that has been taken 100 miles up.

What about identifying military objects that are camouflaged, obscured by clouds or buried underground? Each is now being done—within limits—by Big Bird's sophisticated photography, the technicians indicate.

Avoid cover. Some key locations, including Moscow, are rarely free of cloud cover. So their detailed coverage is coordinated with information received from weather satellites to assure the maximum use of all clear skies.

Some of the photography is "multispectral," with the use of a number of different filters, in order to penetrate the artificial camouflage.

Still other pictures are made with infrared cameras that sense variances in heat given off by different objects. Large underground missile silos, for example, must use heat or air conditioning to keep equipment at a uniform temperature, so these installations stand out starkly on infrared film. With this range of techniques available, the new spy satellites are reportedly able to identify new missile sites, detect shifts in operational procedures suggesting a change in Soviet hardware, keep a watch on industrial facilities, including plants for the assembly of missiles and submarines, and observe progress in the construction of missile silos, launching sites and major radar installations.



Orbiting U.S. spy satellites, from altitude of 100 miles, can read numbers on Soviet Army truck.

Traveling at about 18,000 miles an hour, each satellite can photograph an area half the size of New England in one film clip and return the finished product in a matter of minutes. The system for processing this information is fast enough to find anything suspi-

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cious before it can become dangerous, intelligence officials say.

To be able to home in on an area that suddenly looks suspicious, the most modern satellites are equipped with a set of rockets that can change the spaceship's orbit and send it quickly over any particular spot. Other rockets can shift the spy ship's altitude down for a better look or up for broader coverage.

But most things that the spy satellites look for develop slowly, the experts point out. If a new missile site is being built, for example, surveillance over a period of weeks or months will show new roads or railroads, then construction of buildings, clearing of launching sites and digging of deep holes. All this takes time and increases the chances that the installation will eventually be spotted, no matter how good the camouflage.

A more accurate view. An even more sophisticated version of the American Big Bird satellite, known as the KH-11, is now coming into service, capable of locating precisely and monitoring military installations that are hidden from normal photography.

The great advantage of the new satellite is that it can send back high-quality pictures electronically in minutes, eliminating the delay involved in dropping a film packet from orbit.

The effectiveness of the present generation of U.S. recon satellites can be seen by a sampling of their recent accomplishments. For instance, they—

- Revealed that Russia was constructing a new supersubmarine and a new miniaircraft carrier.
- Knocked down reports of a new Soviet chemical-and-biological-warfare center by showing that the supposed CBW "factory" was actually a reserve arms-storage facility. They also disproved earlier reports of a Russian "missile gap."
- Disclosed that the Soviets were beginning to equip intercontinental-range missiles with MIRV's—multiple independently targeted warheads.

The question now being raised urgently: Are the present U.S. spy satellites good enough to detect cheating by the Russians under a SALT agreement? Ask some of the best-informed sources in Washington, and these are the answers you get:

Defense Secretary Harold Brown insists: "It is my judgment that our monitoring will be such as to provide adequate verification as to Soviet compliance with the curbs on new or modified intercontinental ballistic missiles."

Former Central Intelligence Agency Director William Colby believes the Russians could still hide some weapons,



Missile lifts communications satellite into orbit to listen to Soviet military activities.

but that verification by today's satellites should be good enough "to protect against the other side achieving a strategic advantage." As he sees it, "One undetected missile out of a thousand is not strategic advantage."

Paul C. Warnke, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, contends that "the anticipated strategic-arms agreement is adequately verifiable" by present satellites and on-the-ground intelligence.

Experts directly involved with the satellite system have few if any doubts. "There's no question," says one insider, "that the photorecon satellites, in conjunction with other forms of intelligence, will be fully capable of detecting cheating by the Soviet Union on a scale that could prove dangerous."

Administration officials also argue that the treaty, which bans camouflage, will make it easier to monitor weapons developments. What about the effect of the loss of the monitoring stations in Iran?

Listening devices at those posts were able to detect preparations for missile tests. This permitted the U.S. to position its satellites to get the most detail on the tests. The stations also recorded signals sent back by Soviet missiles during the first few minutes of their flight.

CIA Director Stansfield Turner touched off a furor in early April when he reportedly told a Senate committee in secret testimony that it would take the U.S. as much as five years to replace the intelligence capability it had lost in Iran. President Carter subsequently declared categorically: "The treaty must—and will be—verifiable from the day it is signed."

Carter's assurance was based on a decision, reached after Turner's testimony, to make a multimillion-dollar investment in upgrading the U.S. surveillance systems. This will involve new and improved land, air and satellite systems, all to be in place by 1982.

One problem, according to administration sources, is that the Soviets have recently developed a very low-frequency communications system for use in their weapons tests. The U.S. will have to put what was described as a "bigger ear" on its planes and satellites or it will not be able to pick up these signals.

Although there has been public speculation that the U.S. would use high-flying U-2 spy planes to monitor Soviet tests, other planes, as well as ground stations in a number of countries bordering the Soviet Union, will also be used to replace the Iran facilities.

In addition to the photo satellites, the U.S. has other even more secret satellites that listen to Soviet communications and pick up radar signals. When the Russians fire test rockets into the Pacific, a specially equipped U.S. Navy ship photographs the re-entry and tapes any signals sent out by the missile. A new superpowerful radar set in the Aleutians plots the characteristics of the Soviet missile and its individual warheads.

During missile tests, the new treaty prohibits the Soviets from sending signals back to earth in a way that could impede the U.S. in verifying compliance with the agreement. This provision does not satisfy some critics of the SALT pact.

Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio), a former astronaut, says he is not satisfied the treaty can be verified without the Iran stations. He suggests the treaty provide that the Russians announce their tests in advance and then permit American planes to fly over Soviet territory to monitor them.

More worries. Other critics contend that the real problem is in interpretation. They worry that administration officials devoted to arms control will be reluctant to blow the whistle at the first hint of cheating by the Russians. Furthermore, they contend that the loss of the Iranian stations will make it much more difficult to detect and recognize that first hint of cheating.

In the end, the fate of the new arms treaty in the Senate may hinge on the administration's success in refuting the critics and convincing the lawmakers that spy satellites can do an effective job of policing the pact. □

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What the Soviets Gain, Lose in New Arms Pact

MOSCOW

Not many Russians expect a bright, new era of closer U.S.-Soviet cooperation and understanding to open up as a result of the SALT II agreement.

Yet Soviet leaders believe that the pact is by far the most important development in relations between the two superpowers since détente first began to go sour four years ago.

Officials here in the Soviet capital welcome the treaty for these reasons:

- If it helps to stabilize the strategic balance at rough equality, Moscow would avoid a costly arms race—a competition it is bound to lose in the short run because of its technological inferiority.
- The pact will reinforce détente, which will relax tensions on Russia's European flank at a time when fears of war with China run high.
- The risk of confrontation should be reduced when Russia's status as a superpower equal to the U.S. formally is recognized once and for all.

While Soviet leaders show quiet satisfaction over the agreement, many are turning their attention to the next difficult step—approval by the U.S. Senate.

Moscow is now engaged actively in the selling of SALT to the Senate—for example, by allowing a big increase in Jewish emigration and by swapping jailed dissidents for Soviet spies in the U.S.

"Awkward situation." Efforts by the Senate to modify the treaty seem certain to be poorly received here. The Soviets probably would insist on renegotiating the entire agreement, but this time in an atmosphere of heightened suspicion of U.S. motives. Says a senior American official in Moscow: "Even minor changes will make them very angry and create a highly awkward situation."

Judging by the past, the outlook in that event would not be reassuring. Congress modified the 1972 Soviet-American trade pact in 1974 to link the arrangements to Soviet acceptance of individual freedoms and the right of Soviet dissidents to emigrate. But Moscow renounced the agreement in early 1975, charging that the changes violated the spirit and letter of the document.

That is one side of the coin. The other: If SALT II is ratified, Soviet leaders have made clear they would be prepared to negotiate "more far-reaching measures" in SALT III, including a further lowering of ceilings on intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers.

Although some Americans worry over changing attitudes when a new Soviet leadership takes over from the present aging one, officials here stress that SALT, as the official newspaper *Pravda* said recently, "is a continuing and lasting process."

While the Russians talk about the broad, long-range advantages of the treaty, Western diplomats in Moscow point out that Soviet leaders view other gains as just as important.

Moscow has not, for instance, been forced to accept any linkage between SALT and its future behavior in parts of the world where the U.S. may have vital interests.

The Russians also were not required to commit themselves to work with America in reducing Middle East tensions. And nothing in the agreement suggests that there will be any real slowdown in Soviet production of conventional arms or their continuing use in areas of unrest in black Africa and Asia.

Because the weapons covered by SALT II account for only about 10 percent of the Soviet defense budget, experts see no chance that the treaty will bring heavy cuts in military spending.

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimated last January that Moscow was spending the ruble equivalent of 146 billion dollars a year on defense, and predicted that this amount would continue to rise 3 to 4 percent a year during the first half of the 1980s.

An all-out arms race, considered inevitable without a SALT II pact, would have upped arms spending another 3 to 5 percent a year. The Kremlin wanted to avoid this to protect its already ailing economy.

The concessions the Soviet Union made to get the pact testify to how badly it was wanted.

The Russian leaders agreed to scrap several hundred missile launchers in order to establish a ceiling of equal numbers on both sides. They also agreed to restrict the number of warheads permitted on each missile, and pledged to refrain from deploying their existing SS-16 mobile missiles until the end of 1981, at least. Further, Moscow dropped demands to explicitly bar the U.S. from transferring cruise-missile technology to its allies and from testing long-range ground-based cruise missiles. Some observers have suggested that these concessions were producing divisions inside the Politburo.

President Brezhnev is chief architect of Soviet policy favoring SALT agreement with U.S. But he commands full support of Kremlin leadership.

This view is not generally accepted by Western experts here. They credit President Brezhnev for pushing SALT, but they note that other Soviet leaders fully backed the concept. As a senior Western diplomat puts it: "SALT makes sense for the entire Soviet Union, not just Brezhnev."

Robin Knight, chief of the magazine's bureau in Moscow, filed this dispatch.